U.S. Agency Hypes Security to Jeopardize Cross-Border Communication

The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has issued an order requiring three major Chinese telecom operators — China Mobile, China Telecom, and China Unicom — to resolve what it called "certification issues" in the U.S. Robocall Mitigation Database (RMD) within 14 days.

The RMD's function is to minimize unwanted calls, including illegal and spoofed robocalls. The FCC also demanded that the three Chinese operators demonstrate that their presence in the database poses no threat to U.S. national security and serves the public interest.

It warned that if the companies fail to respond in time, it will remove them from the RMD, and U.S. carriers will stop accepting direct calls from Chinese operators.

According to foreign media reports, this would prevent Chinese operators from connecting to the U.S. telecommunications network — meaning voice calls originating from China and routed through Chinese operators to the U.S. would be blocked. Clearly, such a move would seriously disrupt normal communication between users in both countries.

Cracking down on robocalls is a shared responsibility of telecom operators and regulatory agencies in both China and the U.S. Differences in technology and regulatory rules are normal and can be resolved through dialogue and consultation.

However, the U.S. side is not only demanding that Chinese operators complete certification according to its rules, but also requires them to "prove their innocence" on national security concerns. The essence of this approach is to turn the issue of robocall prevention into a national security matter.

Regardless of whether Chinese operators meet the certification requirements, the FCC can remove them from the database in the name of security, thereby cutting off their direct connection to the U.S. call network and further pushing U.S.-China telecommunications networks and technologies toward decoupling.

In recent years, the FCC has repeatedly invoked national security to elevate its presence in China–U.S. relations, positioning itself as a frontline actor in Washington's efforts to contain China's technology sector.

Between 2019 and 2022, it rejected China Mobile's application to operate in the U.S. and revoked the operating licenses of China Unicom and China Telecom. In 2020, it placed Huawei and ZTE on its "national security threat list," barring their equipment from the U.S. market. In 2022, it again cited security risks to prohibit the sale of products from Huawei, ZTE, Hikvision, and other Chinese companies.

This year, FCC actions have intensified. In March, it established a "Council for National Security" that explicitly aims to respond to what it calls "the threats posed by China," and launched a sweeping investigation into nine Chinese communications technology firms.

In May, it barred laboratories deemed security risks — including Chinese labs — from testing electronic devices for export to the U.S., and subsequently blacklisted 11 Chinese labs in September.

In October, the FCC ordered e-commerce platforms to remove millions of Chinese electronic products on what it claimed were safety grounds, and announced its intention to block Hong Kong Telecom from operating in the U.S.

However, past revelations point to a different reality. The "PRISM" surveillance program exposed by whistleblower Edward Snowden, as well as media reports detailing the CIA's decades-long control of a Swiss encryption-equipment manufacturer used to spy on over 100 countries demonstrate that the U.S. — not China — is the biggest threat to global telecommunications security.

The FCC's portrayal of Chinese telecom firms and products as security risks and its escalating restrictions and sanctions show a classic example of projection.

The consequences of these policies extend beyond geopolitics. Banning Chinese telecom equipment and electronic products has significantly increased the operating costs of U.S. networks and raised expenses for American consumers. Blocking Chinese laboratories has disrupted global electronics supply chains, with additional testing and procurement costs ultimately borne by U.S. buyers.

If the FCC proceeds to restrict Chinese operators' access to the U.S. voice network, it will inevitably obstruct normal communication between users in both countries — creating daily inconveniences and hindering cultural, economic, and business exchanges.

In an era defined by deep globalization and the rapid growth of the digital economy, interconnected telecommunications networks and technologies are an irreversible trend. The FCC should abandon its tendency to over-securitize technical issues, return to its role as a professional regulator, and contribute to the healthy development of telecommunications technologies and industries in the U.S. and worldwide — rather than acting as an obstacle to international cooperation.

Source: Science and Technology Daily